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A B S T R A C T
Something can be gained by looking at common ethical features of different instances of quan-
tification. While ethics of algorithms is perceived at present as an urgent issue, similar concerns
can easily be associated to the use of metrics, of statistical inference, and of mathematical
modelling. By reviewing these common features, strategies of resistance can be imagined to cope
with computational dystopias, metrics fixation and numerical abuse.
1. Introduction
Already in the early eighties, sociologist Beck (1992) listed quantitative methods - together with feminism, neo-Marxism and
specialization, as relevant anchorage point of the old modernity. Three decades later quantification (metrification, numerification)
have greatly expanded in scope, becoming one defining features of the present. Thus, the question of how it is (to be) regulated is
relevant and – as discussed here, urgent. Why, though, an overarching ethics of quantification, and not separate ethics for algorithms,
for metrics, for statistical or mathematical models? Perhaps, something can be gained by analysing common issues in the various
practices of quantification.
One reason is that the explosion of big data analytics and artificial intelligence blurs the difference between data and model: the
understanding of the functioning and of the quality of an algorithm (including possible normative biases) becomes impossible
without knowledge of the data on which the algorithm has been constructed and calibrated (Brauneis & Goodman, 2018), and when
the media discuss about the dangers of Big Data (Redden, 2017), they mostly refer to the use to which these data are put via artificial
intelligence systems. The issue of data versus model separability is not limited to algorithms. The existence of model-laden data with
data-laden models (Edwards, 1999) – and hence the difficulty to understand one without the other, has already been noted when
models and data coevolve in the context e.g. of climate science.
Along the same line, a recent review of five different books on the topic of ‘Sociology of Quantification’ (Popp Berman &
Hirschman, 2018) notes the present blurriness of “quantification”, and asks “what qualities are specific to rankings, or indicators, or
models, or algorithms?”.
A societal reflection has just begun on the ethics of algorithms (Brauneis & Goodman, 2018), where a tension exists between
authorities using these tools and the subjects who are on the receiving end. As noted in (Brauneis & Goodman, 2018) authorities keen
to deflect critiques may welcome the non-transparency provided by algorithms, but this generates among stakeholders exactly those
suspicions and critiques which the authorities wanted to avoid in the first place. Authorities may resort to algorithms to implements
rules which - if applied by human subject - would be either legislated or imposed through administrative rulemaking. Instead, big
data prediction models can be built and used without policy decisions ever having been the object of a political or a traceable
administrative procedure (Brauneis & Goodman, 2018). The range of practices addressed by these algorithmic tools is growing:
decisions about hiring and careers; adjudicating the custody of minors; approving or denying credits; choosing which neighbourhoods
to patrol; whom to free on parole, and more (O’Neil, 2016).
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The urgency around an ethics of algorithms owes much to the accelerating pace and impact of the algorithms and artificial
intelligence in the new social media (Harari, 2018), with their effects on the democratic process with the so called hacking of
elections, (McNamee, 2019), and on the form of the economy associated to the purported emergence of ‘surveillance capitalism’
(Zuboff, 2019). For others, the same human condition is prey to a new breed of pathologies associated with the new media (Lanier,
2018), while for the jurist Alain Supiot the law is subjugated to the calculation of utilities in a new system of ‘governance by numbers’
(Supiot, 2007). I argue that while algorithms appear to pose a clear and present danger, other instances of quantification – such as
metrics, statistical inference and mathematical modelling, can also have an enduring and damaging influence. The ongoing discussion
in statistics, where the same concept of significance is challenged (Amrhein et al., 2019; Gelman, 2019), can be seen together with the
so called ‘metrics fixation’ (Muller, 2018) and with the improper use of mathematical modelling (Pilkey & Pilkey-Jarvis, 2009).
Tolstoy famously noted in his work Ana Karenina that while happy families are all alike, unhappy ones are unhappy in their
different ways. Malpractices in the different families of quantification resemble the unhappy families of Tolstoy: an algorithm may
embed racial prejudice, a statistical study may be underpowered, a metric may induce goal displacements while a mathematical
model may be an instance of mathematical hubris.
Yet, common patterns may exist which justify an overarching ethics of quantification:
• All quantifications are embedded in some scientific discipline, and science is itself a social activity (Ravetz, 1971). The mutated
social conditions of the conduct of science, identified as among the root causes of the present scientific irreproducibility crisis
(Harris, 2017; Saltelli & Funtowicz, 2017), thus affect all quantifications.
• An example of the above is the Darwinian fitness of bad practices (Smaldino & McElreath, 2016), which tend to reproduce
themselves more effectively than the good ones in the present system of incentives (Begley & Ioannidis, 2015). Perverse incentives
include the imperative to publish or perish, where production standards are measured by impersonal (sciento-)metrics, and the
extreme forms of competition for grant procurements found in the labour market of research (Ruben, 2017). This produces a sort
of Gresham’s Law of scientific information.
• Along similar lines, science’s commoditization (Mirowski, 2011) can influence e.g. cutting statistical corners in medical research
(Harris, 2017), while the increasingly mediatization of both science and policy intensifies the use of numbers to score economic
advantages or political legitimacy points (Saltelli & Boulanger, 2019).
There is a longstanding relation between societal use of numbers and the existing social-economic order (Shapin & Schaffer,
2011). ‘Statistics’ was created as an instrument of modern statecraft (Hacking, 1990). Official statistics inevitably reflect the priorities
and presuppositions of those whose interests are served by the state (Frankenstein, 1983). Sociology of science points to ‘numbers of
neoliberalism’ (Porter, 2012), whereby a blind faith in numbers underpins the maintenance of the status quo, for example in relation
to the existing financial centres of calculation (Ravetz, 2008). For Theodor Porter “funny numbers have given a definite advantage to
financial markets”, where these numbers are played in the ‘theatre of insanity’. Onstage, ostensibly boring numbers are used to shape
momentous decision e.g. in relation to financial movements. Offstage the same numbers become the arena for intense struggle and
manipulation of the involved parties vying for power and profit. In fact the perils of the financial numbers is as high or possibly
higher (Wilmott & Orrell, 2017) than that of the algorithmic ones. I have argued that such elements of insanity emerge frequently in
the exercise of quantification, including in statistical and mathematical modelling (Saltelli, 2018a, 2019).
2. What issues for an ethics of quantification?
The case for a new ethics is offered here, in relation to issues scarcely – and never universally, addressed in various domain of
quantification.
2.1. The issue of trust
An ethics of quantification is needed because of the symbiotic relationship between quantification and trust (Porter, 1996). A
climate of trust favours sensible quantifications, while a climate of regulatory confusion or controversy breeds ‘mandated’ quanti-
fications, which are less so. Societal trust in numbers plays into the hands of institutions in need of legitimacy, which can gain it by
producing a metric and having it accepted by a relevant audience (Porter, 1996).
The controversy surrounding the use of OECD PISA metrics in education (Araujo, Saltelli, & Schnepf, 2017; Meyer & Zahedi,
2014), is a clear illustration of this process: by developing this set of measurements - in a sense a blessing for educationalists and
econometricians in need of comparable data across countries - the OECD has gained epistemic authority from national and regional
educational authorities. Several scholars have questioned the legitimacy of this process, the metrics’ ideological framing, and the
distorting effect of goal displacement induced by the PISA tests (Araujo et al., 2017).
2.2. A defence against abuse
What to do when confronted with dubious numbers? Or with practices of metrification or statistical measurement which affect
one’s own practice or life? Jerry Z. Muller in his Tyranny of Metrics discusses examples of unintended consequences due to the
prevalent fixation with the use of metrics (Table 1).
The intended positive function of indicators and benchmarks appears vulnerable to gaming and goal displacement whenever
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“approval, payment, or some other desired end is made contingent on achieving a quantitative standard” (Porter, 2012). This is
known as the Goodhart’s (Goodhart, 1981) or Campbell's (Campbell, 1979) law, though an earlier formulation is due to Jerome
Ravetz, for whom when the goals of a task are complex, sophisticated, or subtle, then crude systems of measurements can be’ gamed’
by those persons possessing the skills to execute the tasks properly, who thus manage to achieve their own goals to the detriment of
those assigned (Ravetz, 1971; University of California, 2016).
In France a current known as Stat-Activisme (Bruno, Didier, & Prévieux, 2014) proposes to ‘fight against’ as well as ‘fight with’
numbers, using a variety of strategies against metrification or statistical abuse; these include ‘statistical judo’ – i.e. gaming the metrics
(a-la-Goodhart) as an act of self-defence; exposing the hypocrisy or the vacuity of existing metrics, e.g. by denouncing the middle-class
bias of an existing consumer price index, and developing a new one in defence of the purchasing power of the worse off; or practicing
the classic function of statistics to identify areas of exclusion and neglect. Finally, initiative of self-defence can lead to a totally new
system of measurement, as the new barometer for inequality poverty (BIP40), realized and maintained between 2001 and 2007 by the
Réseau d'alerte sur les inégalités, a French collective of activists in dissent with the numbers of official statistics. With some help from
the press (Le Monde) the collective managed in 2004 to obtain the attention of the relevant French statistical authorities, to the effect
of a greater investment of official statistics itself in the conjoint analysis of both poverty and inequality, realized in partnership with a
plurality of social actors. The constructive engagement of the collective with official statistics shows how numbers can be fought with
numbers. Stat-Activisme takes inspiration from a long tradition of sociology of numbers as discussed in in (Bruno et al., 2014).
2.3. To prevent consequentialism in scientific quantification
Following a purely consequentialist approach to ethics implies that the consequences of one's action are the ultimate basis for a
judgment about the rightness of the action. Seen through these lenses a quantification which is particularly effective in commu-
nication and mobilizing about a social or environmental threat would be right, in a sense independently from its scientific quality.
This could be, for example, the case of the Environmental Footprint. As the time of writing the present article the 2019 edition of the
measure – taken up by most media, just informed that in 2019 humans have overshot 100 % of the planet yearly resources by July 29,
and that by the end of the year humans activities shall have used 1.75 planets, instead of the one available. The critique that follows
might appear to the reader one of those academic disputes which are all the most virulent the less important are the points of
contention. In fact, several scholars of different orientation and discipline have noted that while it is evident that man is over-
exploiting natural resources, the metrification of this into numbers and dates (1.75 planets, July 29) as proposed by the Ecological
Footprint does not withstand scrutiny. The details can be read in the exchange of papers written by both proponents and dissenters
(Galli et al., 2016; Giampietro & Saltelli, 2014a, 2014b; Goldfinger, Wackernagel, Galli, Lazarus, & Lin, 2014; Blomqvist et al., 2013a,
2013b; Rees & Wackernagel, 2013; Van Den Bergh & Grazi, 2010). Summarizing these critiques – which include the negative jud-
gement of the international commission on the measurement of progress led by Nobel laureates Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz with
the French economist Jean-Paul Fitoussi (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009) would take much of the space available for the present work.
Suffices to say that the 1.75 planets could easily be twenty or two hundred or infinity, if numbers have a meaning, depending on what
impacts are measured and how; that the impact of human activity on the planet is too complex to be captured by a single number with
three digits accuracy (1.75); and that the concept whereby the earth has a neat yearly budget which humans can use is incredibly
optimist against all those impacts which are irreversible – e.g. loss of species, depletion of non-renewable resources, persistent
pollutants and so on. The Ecological Footprint is very effective in showing the urgency of action to reduce the pressure on the planet.
Why should one be fastidious about the details? A number conveys an irresistible impression of accuracy and allows the setting of
target. If humanity could take 5 days away every year from the overshot date (Global Footprint Network, 2019) – as suggested by the
proponents, things would go in the right direction. Unfortunately, as agreed by all critics – this measure is particularly ineffective for
policy, e.g. in prioritizing what aspects of this pressure to reduce. If there must be an ethics of quantification which is not purely
consequentialist, the seduction of the Ecological Footprint should be resisted.
2.4. Who is responsible?
The case of the ecological footprint is not unique. If one were to mention other extremely successful measures of recent times – by
impact of society and academia alike, one would likely mention the Shanghai Rankings – known as Academic Ranking of World
Universities (ARWU). Neither the ecological footprint nor ARWU were developed by international organizations (such as the OECD,
EC, WTO, WEF…), by a statistical office, by a pre-existing disciplinary stronghold or by a think tank. Their fortune owes to the work
and the ingenuity of their developers. Though the flaws of ARWU are venial (Paruolo, Saisana, & Saltelli, 2013; Saisana, d’Hombres,
& Saltelli, 2011), before the audacious acrobatics of the ecological footprint just discussed, both measures have received pointed
criticism from academia and practitioners. Note also that while the ecological footprint scores low on quality, it is not particularly
damaging – one would assume, in its societal implications; it reminds humans inhabiting the developed world that they should
consume less, and this admonition is couched into an overall non stressing – one might say optimistic, vision of humanity’s impact on
the planet. To the extent that no actual policy is undertaken to match its scores, - e.g. that no country reduces its food import just to be
seen consuming less ‘ghost land’ (Giampietro & Saltelli, 2014a; Stiglitz et al., 2009), the Ecological Footprint measure makes media
satisfied and the publics - in a sense, sedated. The ARWU, while apparently less ambitious in scope, has been rightly noted for its
performativity: it forces the university system in the trajectories of a global market for education (Éloire, 2010). Thus, it has been
labelled as societally damaging – a least by some observers.
As evident, the media appear to have little interest in technical disquisitions before the effectiveness of an appealing narrative.
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Thus, little of the existing criticisms has truly impacted the societal use and take up of these two metrics. This poses the question of
who is responsible, when the public intellectuals populating media and academia apparently fail in their role. An interpretation of
this conundrum in terms a media system overflowing the specific systems of science, technology and policy is offered in (Saltelli &
Boulanger, 2019) using the theoretical implant of Luhmann’s social system theory.
2.5. To moderate excesses of optimism about the merits of quantification
The prevailing wisdom is that of a substantial optimism that a quantification is always useful to provide the hard facts on which
policies can be adjudicated. In 2018 William Nordhaus, an economist, was one of the winners of the so-called Nobel Prize in
Economic Sciences for his work to understand the interactions between society and nature. His “Dynamic Integrated Climate-
Economy model” lets the user make different assumptions about environmental policy and see how the consequences of those
assumptions may play out over the course of a century. Thus, one might look to assess the impact a carbon-reduction policy will have
on a country’s economic output from now until 2100 and compare that to a “no policy” scenario or to other policies. An alternative
view would be that such quantifications have little relevance, due the large associated uncertainties (Saltelli & d’Hombres, 2010;
Saltelli et al., 2015). The prevailing wisdom is likewise illustrated by Cass Sunstein, winner of the Holberg Prize for 2018, also a
strong advocate of cost benefit analyses in order to adjudicate policy decisions. When Sunstein said “immersion in the facts often
makes value disagreements feel much less relevant” (Matthews, 2018) he was telling us about his preferences rather than asserting a
general fact. Following Giandomenico Majone (Majone, 1989), one could inscribe the contribution of Sunstein – including his theory
of ‘nudging’, as an example of Decisionism, a technocratic approach whereby issues can be ‘depoliticized’ by an economic analysis
(Timms, 2019). What is being implied here is not that different instruments of quantification are systematically fallacious, but that
excessive faith is being posed in their virtues by the existing system of governance by numbers (Supiot, 2007).
The view that the ‘good’ can be neatly computed is heir to a long intellectual tradition of quantification, which goes from the
mathématique sociale of Condorcet (Feldman, 2005) to the utilitarianism of Bentham to the decisionism of post-war bureaucracies
(Majone, 1989). A parallel critique has a similarly lengthy tradition. For Langdon Winner – one of the fathers of ecological movement,
cost benefit and risk analyses are traps into which environmental activists should not fall (Winner, 1989). For the movement known
as post normal science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993) quantifications should be evaluated based on their quality, foremost in relation to
their management of uncertainties and their fitness for the intended function (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1994) – see below the tools
NUSAP and sensitivity auditing. The need for vigilance and resistance against malpractices is present in the statistical community
(Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2014; Gelman, 2019; Stark & Saltelli, 2018), in PNS (Peters & Besley, 2019), and in the already mentioned
current of Stat-Activisme (Bruno et al., 2014). In conclusion, the vision defended here clashes with the prevailing wisdom exemplified
by Nordhaus and Sunstein, and defined elsewhere (Pereira & Funtowicz, 2015) as a Cartesian dream of prediction and control of man
over nature. This minority view benefits nevertheless from the intellectual support of a vast spectrum of scholarship, from ecology to
sociology to law, as discussed in the present work.
2.6. For the non-neutrality of techniques
Can it be said that ‘The technique is never neutral’ (Saltelli, 2018a)? While the statement may appear apodictic, practitioners
admit that the choice of the tool can steer the answer in a desired direction.
As noted by Giandomenico Majone (Majone, 1989):
“In any area of public policy the choice of instruments, far from being a technical exercise that can be safely delegated to the
experts, reflects as in a microcosm all the political, moral, and cultural dimensions of policy-making.”
Majone (Majone, 1989) also noted that the ostensible distinction between facts and value can be used instrumentally in the policy
process, where fact and values cannot always be neatly separated in the making of an argument. A case in point is when the
quantification concerns risk. For Ulrich Beck (Beck, 1992).
Risk determinations are an unrecognized, still underdeveloped symbiosis of the natural and human sciences, of everyday and
expert rationality, of interests and facts. They are simultaneously neither simply the one nor only the other.
Beck then goes on to note that in risk determination interests and facts cannot be isolated via specialization, and subjected to
standards of rationality. Instead, these determinations require “cooperation across the trenches of disciplines, citizens’ groups, fac-
tories, administration and politics”.
This prescription, identical in many respects to the ‘extended peer community’ recommended by Funtowicz and Ravetz
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993), also includes its own nemesis in that in conflicted issues the cooperation might disintegrate into
antagonistic “definitional struggles”.
If the example taken from the discussion of risk determinations is taken to show that facts and values cannot always be separated
in public policy, this must be true as well for the ‘hyper-facts’ generated via computer algorithms and mathematical models.
A common case of unethical quantification is when political conflicts and power asymmetries are ignored in favour of reframing
the issue as a technical one (Ravetz, 1971). As example, in the field of food ethics (Saltelli & Lo Piano, 2017) better diets and more
efficient agricultural systems have been proposed to improve the food scenarios of tomorrow, without mention of the fact that access
to food is unequally distributed over the planet between haves and haves-nots, so that the problem is not scarcity, but inequality of
provision, and quality of product. As another example, while opposition to genetically modified food and staples has considerably to
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do with issues of choice, power and political control of an important technology, it is often presented as a unsubstantiated food scare,
to be dealt with via better technical communication with the public and by science education (Marris, 2001).
Quantification can be a tool for ‘socially constructed ignorance’ (Ravetz, 1987), A mathematical model can be effectively used to
‘displace’ attention away from uncomfortable knowledge. This is achieved when the model – not the issue being modelled – becomes
the focus of the attention (Rayner, 2012).
In Economics the non-neutrality of numbers has been the subject of a discussion started by Paul Romer, who coined the term
‘Mathiness’ to point to the use of mathematics to veil normative stances in growth models (Romer, 2015). For some observers the
mathematization of economics is a recurrent problem in the discipline (Reinert, 2000), which is associated by some with a tendency
of economists to prefer ‘model-land’ to the messiness of the real (Smith & A., 2019).
An ethics of quantification needs to be constantly aware of the relationships between knowledge and power (Lyotard, 1979;
Ravetz, 1990; Shapin & Schaffer, 2011) – a topic which is too vast to be tackled here, but which is useful as a reminder of the need to
consider any quantification in the context of a system of normative frames and power relations, all the more so when quantifications
feed into the policy process (Saltelli & Giampietro, 2017; Saltelli, 2018b).
2.7. A need to contextualize quantifications
Any number that does not represent its context and purpose of production runs the risk obfuscating as much as illuminating. In
mathematical modelling it is increasingly realized that no validation is possible if the purpose of a model is not specified in advance
(Edmonds et al., 2019). Similar recommendations can be found in a recent checklist of good practices in modelling (Jakeman,
Letcher, & Norton, 2006). In this respect it is important to note that it is easier to cheat with models - and to get away with it - than it
is to cheat with data. The sense of this remark is that while a lot of academic and mediatic attention surrounds statistical malpractices
such as P-Hacking (adjusting the data to obtain a usable or publishable inference) and HARKing (adjusting the research hypothesis to
the same effect) (Stark & Saltelli, 2018), less attention is given to possible modelling malpractices, such as adjusting the model to the
desiderata of the analysts and/or of their clients; see (Saltelli, 2018a, 2019) for a discussion.
A radical version of this precept can be found in (Zyphur & Pierides, 2017) where it is suggested that the quality of a quantitative
research must be reframed in terms of “relational validity”, understood as the correspondence and alignment of the purpose of the
research, in terms of addressing a worldly problem, its orientation, and the way it is performed. If research purposes are defined, then
research orientation can be subordinated to them, answering questions such as “for whom is research done?’’, “to what end?”, “in
support of what?” and so forth. This expanded scope prompts thinking broadly in terms of what is to be achieved. Likewise, methods
(ways of doing) can thus be aligned with purpose and orientation. The authors note that such an agenda transcends the prevailing
disciplinary and positivistic view of facts and reality:
[…] a theorized singular external world—or, simply, ‘reality’ in the representation and correspondence narrative—is often un-
derstood as being somehow naturally constituted rather than existing as the product of QR [quantified research] practices. In
other words, researchers fail to see the rather obvious reality that they coproduce what they propose to merely represent, in-
cluding populations, variables, statistical parameters, chance or probabilities, and constructs
The authors are clear that such an ambitious agenda is being prescribed for the scope of a single journal (Journal of Business
Ethics), and that for such a “vision to be developed a monumental shift in what many QR practitioners care about must occur”
(Zyphur & Pierides, 2017).
2.8. To deter quantification hubris
Perhaps nowhere as in the specific case of mathematical modelling one has elements to detect an excessive use of the technique,
something which might be called a quantification hubris. I have already mentioned the computation of the cost of climate action/
inaction at the year 2100, which pales when compared to what the authors in (Pilkey & Pilkey-Jarvis, 2009) call “A Million Years of
Certainty” relative to a model-based computation of the risk of a nuclear waste disposal one million years into the future.
In environmental modelling a known trade-off is that between modelling bias (or model inaccuracy) and model error, see Fig. 1.
This is known as the O’Neill conjecture (see p. 70 in. (Turner & Gardner, 2015)). It implies that neglecting aspects of the phenomenon
being modelled may lead to a systematic bias, while being more ambitious in describing the system – making the model more
complex, comes at the cost to introducing new parameters, whose estimation entails uncertainties which carry on through the model
to increase the error in prediction.
Analogous to this trade-off are known in data science, as under- and over-fitting: if the order of the interpolation polynomial – or
the number of nodes in a learning network – is too low, then one may fit poorly the existing (learning) points; if one fits the existing
points too well, by increasing e.g. the number of nodes, one will do less well when new points are added. In system analysis the same
conundrum is called Zadeh’s principle of incompatibility, whereby as complexity increases “precision and significance (or relevance)
become almost mutually exclusive characteristics” (Zadeh, 1973). How can the right balance be found? The answer is indeed simple:
a proper uncertainty quantification and global sensitivity analysis can map the uncertainty in the model output back to the un-
certainty in its inputs, thereby informing on the limits of one’s knowledge in relation to the task. It is the impression of this author
that most often modellers err on the side of making their model too ambitious, i.e. modelling hubris is more of a problem that model
parsimony. In support of this conjecture a classic paper in hydrology notes (Hornberger & Spear, 1981):
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“[…] most simulation models will be complex, with many parameters, state-variables and non-linear relations. Under the best
circumstances, such models have many degrees of freedom and, with judicious fiddling, can be made to produce virtually any
desired behaviour, often with both plausible structure and parameter values.”
In defence of modellers, the virtues of models simple to the point of unrealism have been extolled by the economist Milton
Friedman, who noted that the most significant theories - those most precious for modelling - are based on the most unrealistic of
assumptions (Friedman, 1953; Reinert, Endresen, Ianos, & Saltelli, 2016). While this approach has merits, one might ask who decides,
though, about what counts as a significant theory. Significant to whom? And for what purpose? Along similar lines economist Joseph
Stiglitz argues that the utility of models depends precisely on their acting as ‘blinders’, which by eliminating from the view the
confusion of the real allows economists to investigate in detail the working of the elements left under the microscope. The ‘leaving
out’ is also fraught with normative implications, e.g. when what is left out is a relevant viewpoint on the nature of the problem. These
are the same issues just discussed in relation to the work of (Zyphur & Pierides, 2017); see also sensitivity auditing (Saltelli,
Guimaraes Pereira, van der Sluijs, & Funtowicz, 2013), discussed below.
2.9. Because of an existing gap
Existing ethical precepts for quantitative research tend to iterate orthodox Mertonian norms of scientific ethos (Merton, 1973),
such as universalism, disinterestedness, communalism and organized skepticism, possibly augmented by concerns to protect animal
or human subjects of a quantitative study, especially when humans are members of a vulnerable group, see e.g. (The Norwegian
Research Ethics Committees (Etikkom) (2015)). Specific norms such as those of official statistics (European Commission & Statistical
Office of the European Union, 2017) are absent in other instances of quantification, and this is reflected – in certain fields – in a
Feyerabendian ‘anything goes’, both methodologically and in relation to the consequences of quantification. The case of the OECD-
PISA metrics and their unintended consequences have been already mentioned (Araujo et al., 2017; Meyer & Zahedi, 2014). A similar
lack of ethical consideration on the consequences of quantitative research in education is lamented for the case of mathematics, in
relation to the TIMSS study, and where the situation has led to “Math Wars”, especially in the US (Jones, 2000). All cases discussed in
the present work, from the Ecological Footprint to the modelling of one million years into the future, bear testimony of the absence of
specific norms for responsible quantification.
3. What recipes would be offered by an ethics of quantification?
A quantification hubris should not be replaced with a hubris of recipes. A few general recommendations are offered here.
3.1. A license not-to-quantify
The shortcomings of forced quantification already discussed (Porter, 1996) would suggest that quantification at gunpoint could or
should be resisted. In the concluding notes to his Tyranny of Metrics (Muller, 2018) J.Z. Muller notes:
"Considering all of the above keep in mind at every step that “the best use of metrics may be not to use it at all”"
This is not an easy target. In several instances quantifications are compulsory, e.g. grants cannot be secured by a researcher if she
does not prove the worth of her work via the existing system of metrics, and nobody in a scientific career – all the more so if young,
can realistically imagine to escape the ‘metric tide’ (Wilsdon, 2016) rolling over scientific production. It is not unusual for a research
program to ask the applicants to specify how the impact of a proposal will be measured against which indicators, which evidently
condition the nature of the proposal.
Fig. 1. Model error versus model complexity, adapted from (Turner & Gardner, 2015).
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3.2. Taming hubris: memento Fig. 1
While in statistics and data analysis methods are available to guard against overfitting, the situation in mathematical modelling is
more confused. While a thorough uncertainty quantification and sensitivity analysis would help the analyst to tune the complexity of
the model to the quality of the existing data – e.g. to identify the minimum in Fig. 1, these methods are not of general use (Ferretti,
Saltelli, & Tarantola, 2016). Often sensitivity analysis is performed ignoring statistical good practices of experimental design and data
analysis (Saltelli et al., 2019).
3.3. Make use of the existing disciplinary arrangements
As just mentioned, mathematical modelling could benefit from structure and standards based on statistical principles including a
systemic appraisal of model uncertainties and parametric sensitivities. A step in the right direction would be that statistics inter-
nalizes these tools into its own syllabi and practices (Saltelli, 2018a, 2019).
3.4. Make quantifications interpretable, conveyable in plain English and context specific; use existing pedigrees
Models – including algorithms, should be made inherently interpretable (Lipton, 2018). This can be achieved via a variety of
strategies. Sensitivity analysis could be used to reduce model complexity so that a cut-to-the bone version of the model can be used
for an audit or a negotiation. Economists such as Alfred Marshall (Marshall, 1925) and Paul Krugman (Krugman, 2009) recommended
using modelling as scaffolding, to be taken out once the edifice of a theory has been built, so that the result can be explained in plain
language.
Since all model-knowing is conditional, the conditionality should be made explicit. For key models used in policy, peer review
should be enriched to include auditing by an extended peer community involving a plurality of disciplines and interested actors,
leading to model pedigrees (Eker, Rovenskaya, Obersteiner, & Langan, 2018; Saltelli, 2018a). As discussed in the first part of this
article, any number that does not clarify the context and purpose of its production is incomplete (Edmonds et al., 2019; Jakeman
et al., 2006; Zyphur & Pierides, 2017), and this information should be a fundamental ingredient of the quality of a quantification. All
these considerations feed into two existing tools for the quality of quantification: NUSAP and sensitivity auditing.
3.5. NUSAP
Addressing virtually all species of quantification, NUSAP (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; van der Sluijs et al., 2005) is a notational
system for the management and communication of uncertainty in science for policy, based on five categories for characterizing any
quantitative statement. The categories are Numeral, Unit, Spread, Assessment and Pedigree.
• Numeral is the number produced by the quantification, and Unit refers to its units. Spread is an assessment of the error in the
value of the Numeral.
• Assessment conveys qualitative judgements – possibly produced by a panel or by an extended peer community - about the
quantification. Pedigree, likewise the result of a collective evaluation, looks at the mode of production and of anticipated use of
the information.
While the first three are ordinarily met in the quantification practices, assessment and pedigree represent an innovation, whose
application presupposes an ‘extended peer community’. An online net (van der Sluijs, 2019) maintains information about applications
of the method. NUSAP is suggested in a recent European report by the European Academies’ association of science for policy SAPEA
(Science Advice for Policy by European Academies, 2019).
3.6. Sensitivity auditing
Suggested in both the SAPEA report (Science Advice for Policy by European Academies, 2019) and in the European Union
guidelines for impact assessment (European Commission, 2009), sensitivity auditing (Saltelli et al., 2013; Saltelli & Funtowicz, 2014)
owes much to the perspective and logic of NUSAP, and is tailored to model-based quantification. It proposes seven rules, to be read as
a reminder of important aspects of quantification which an analyst might want to investigate. The rules – which can be used both to
make sense of an existing quantification or to robustify one against a spectrum of criticisms, are:
• Rule 1: ‘Check against rhetorical use of mathematical modelling’; are results being over-interpreted? Is the model being used
ritually or rhetorically?
• Rule 2: ‘Adopt an “assumption hunting” attitude’; this would focus on unearthing possibly implicit assumptions.
• Rule 3: ‘Detect pseudo-science’; this asks whether uncertainty has been downplayed, as discussed above, or amplified, in order to
favour an agenda.
• Rule 4: ‘Find sensitive assumptions before these find you’; this is a reminder that before publishing results the analysis of sen-
sitivity should be done and made accessible to researchers.
• Rule 5: ‘Aim for transparency’. This rule echoes present debates on open data, and of the need for a third party to be able to
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replicate a given analysis.
• Rule 6: ‘Do the right sums’; the analysis should not solve the wrong problem – doing the right sums is more important than doing
the sums right. This rule is about asking whether the given quantification is not neglecting important alternatives framings of the
issue.
• Rule 7: ‘Focus the analysis on the key question answered by the model, exploring holistically the entire space of the assumptions’.
An important implication of this rule is that a model cannot be audited for sensitivity once and for all, but needs to be re-audited
in the context of each specific application of the model.
Examples of application of sensitivity auditing – of one form or another, are to the OECD-PISA study and the food security case
already described in the present work (Araujo et al., 2017; Saltelli & Lo Piano, 2017). Other applications are to the costing of climate
change (Saltelli & d’Hombres, 2010), nutrition (Lo Piano & Robinson, 2019), the ecological footprint (Galli et al., 2016; Giampietro &
Saltelli, 2014a, 2014b; Goldfinger et al., 2014), and GMO (Saltelli, Giampietro, & Gomiero, 2017).
Used in the context of an ethics of quantification both NUSAP and sensitivity auditing can be used to reveal the normative
implications of a quantification. This approach aimed to uncover underlying, unspoken, frames and metaphors has been suggested
before in the field of mathematical modelling (Ravetz, 2003) and is applicable to all instances of quantification discussed here.
4. Conclusions
The introduction mentioned that something can be gained by analysing common issues in the various practices of quantification.
The analysis has shown common problematic patterns which would lend themselves to the therapies just highlighted.
If the considerations of the present article have some utility, and an ethics of quantification can be usefully conceived, problems
would still persist in how its principles could be pursued and disseminated. The idea that numbers as different as
• A consumer price index
• A credit rating
• The price of a bundle of derivatives
• The number of planets needed by humanity in one year
• The gross domestic product to the year 2100
• The numerical risk of an industrial product or practice
need to come under some sort of collective ethical umbrella or even policing may sound as a topic for science fiction. Additionally,
not all quantifications involve visible numbers – for example, facial recognition software crunches them just below the surface. It is
relevant to note that among the numbers above, the first is regulated in advanced countries by existing codes of conduct (European
Commission & Statistical Office of the European Union, 2017). This leads to the question whether the others might be in need of
similar arrangements, of the same ambition advocated for quantitative research by (Zyphur & Pierides, 2017). Scholars trained in the
use of numbers have the mental habit of questioning their solidity. The same concept is not absent from popular culture. When Homer
Simpson says “Oh people can come up with statistics to prove anything, Kent. Forty percent of all people know that” he is si-
multaneously (ironically) paying tribute both to the existing addiction to numbers and to the underlying suspicion that this amounts
to a ritual. The traditional English joke about ‘lies, damned lies and statistics’ expresses a similar reserve.
One could imagine codes of good conducts for responsible quantification such as those available today for responsible innovation,
or for the use of various technologies. While these approaches are not without problems (Strand, 2019), a reflection would be useful
(Symposium, Bergen, 2019).
Statistics – of the non-official sort, is itself a discipline, and disposes of the disciplinary fora and leaders to discuss problems such
as those addressed here (Saltelli, 2018a). This is less the case for mathematical modelling, metrics, big data and artificial intelligence,
though on the latter a considerable ethical work is taking place, including plans of a ‘New Deal on Data’ (Pentland, 2009). Some
thinkers lament (Supiot, 2007) or advocate (Mayer-Schönberger & Ramge, 2018) the advent of an era of government by numbers in
order to supplant market as the best adjudicators of everything (Mayer-Schönberger & Ramge, 2018). Whether this would yield
dystopia or utopia is the subject of a debate (Bastani, 2019; Morozov, 2019; Mostafa, 2018; Zuboff, 2019). Could or should the
committed experts compute society’s way to socialism (Bastani, 2019), or save capitalism from its ‘surveillance’ degeneration (Zuboff,
2019) or strive to control the excesses of financial centres of calculation (Wilmott & Orrell, 2017)? If Alain Supiot is right that the
existing governance by number – heir to both Taylorism and Soviet planning, is disrupting all western civilization’s familiar legal
frameworks - the state, democracy and law itself, and many forms of human solidarity, then we have entered the era of the cybernetic
imaginary, which revives the West's age-old dream of grounding social harmony in calculations. Here the goal of governing by just
laws is repudiated in favour of the attainment of measurable objectives, where law is subjugated to a computation of utility. This is
the ‘quantification of ethics’ alluded to in the title of the present work.
These are indeed important and urgent questions, beyond the scope of this discussion. The role of an ethics of quantification in
this context is all to be discovered and constructed, but to the extent that impending transformations of the existing social orders are
under way, such an ethics could play a useful role.
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